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Abstract 
Two studies were conducted evaluating aspects of the States of Mind (SOM) Model proposed by 
Schwartz (1986; Schwartz & Garamoni, 1986, 1989) with a sample of social phobic subjects. First, the 
SOM ratio [positive thoughts/(positive + negative thoughts)] based on a thought-listing task was 
compared to a ratio based on Kendall and Hollon’s (1981) “power-of-nonnegative-thinking” model 
[negative thoughts/(positive + negative + neutral thoughts)], and the relationship of each ratio to 
criterion measures was assessed. The two ratios were highly correlated and related to several crite-
rion measures, raising questions about the role of neutral thoughts in the internal dialogue. Second, 
SOM ratios derived from a thought-listing task and from the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test 
(SISST) were compared to assess the reactivity of the SOM ratio and classification scheme to method 
of cognitive assessment. In that study, large differences were detected. SISST SOMs were less likely 
to classify subjects in the more pathological SOM categories and more likely to be significantly re-
lated to criterion measures. Findings are discussed in the context of the validity of the SOM model 
and the effects of cognitive assessment methodology on the magnitude of derived self-statement 
ratios. 
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Cognitive-behavioral researchers have had a continuing interest in the nature of the inter-
nal dialogue and its relationship to psychopathology and adjustment (Kendall & Hollon, 
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1981). As early as 1979, Kendall and Korgeski suggested that measurement of the internal 
dialogue was central to the developing field of cognitive-behavior therapy and that the 
development of valid and reliable assessment measures was a top priority. Since that time, 
a variety of endorsement (e.g., self-statement questionnaire) and production (e.g., thought 
listing) methods have been developed to assess cognitive contents relevant to a wide vari-
ety of target behaviors. For instance, self-statement inventories have been developed for 
the assessment of the internal dialogue related to depression (Hollon & Kendall, 1980), 
assertiveness (Heimberg, Chiauzzi, Becker, & Madrazo-Peterson, 1983; Schwartz & Gott-
man, 1976), job-interview anxiety (Heimberg, Keller, & Peca-Baker, 1986), social anxiety 
(Glass, Merluzzi, Biever, & Larsen, 1982), and reactions to stressful medical procedures 
(Kendall, Williams, Pechacek, Graham, Shisslak, & Herzoff, 1979), to name just a few. 
Almost all studies of the internal dialogue have assessed the valence of reported or en-
dorsed self-statements and classified them as either positive (facilitative of adaptive be-
havior), negative (hindering adaptive behavior), or neutral (not clearly positive or negative 
or not related to the target behavioral event). The predominant finding to arise from these 
studies has been that the frequency of negative self-statements has had a stronger impact 
than the frequency of positive self-statements, either showing a stronger relationship to 
measures of psychopathology or a greater degree of separation between functional and 
dysfunctional groups. This has led Kendall and Hollon (1981) and other authors (e.g., Am-
koff & Glass, 1989; Heimberg et al., 1986) to comment on the “power of nonnegative think-
ing” and promote the idea that it may be more important to reduce negative thinking than 
it is to increase the frequency of other categories of self-statements. 
Recent authors, however, have begun to place greater emphasis on the potentially im-
portant role of positive thought and affect. For instance, Watson and Tellegen (1985) have 
suggested that anxiety and depression may be differentiated by examining the differences 
between anxious and depressed persons on measures of both positive and negative affec-
tivity. While both groups may be characterized by high negative affectivity, only depressed 
persons appear to demonstrate impairments in positive affectivity. This reasoning has re-
cently led Ingram and Wisnicki (1988) and Kendall, Howard, and Hays (1989) to develop 
measures of positive automatic thoughts that would accompany or expand the more es-
tablished but negative-thought-oriented Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (Hollon & 
Kendall, 1980) in the assessment of depression. 
Schwartz (1986) and Schwartz and Garamoni (1986, 1989) have presented another 
model of the balance of positive and negative cognition in psychopathology, the States of 
Mind (SOM) model, which has received a large amount of recent attention in the literature. 
They present an elegant treatise suggesting that optimal adjustment is represented in a 
balance of positive and negative cognition such that the ratio of positive thoughts to the 
sum of positive and negative thoughts [P/(P + N)] approaches 0.618. In the development of 
their model, they have suggested that there are potentially five different states of mind, 
characterized by different values of the SOM ratio. As noted, optimal adjustment is asso-
ciated with a “set point” of 0.618 and a possible range of values of 0.56 to 0.68 (the Positive 
Dialogue). This SOM is said to represent the most adaptive combination of optimism and 
necessary attention to negative events. Mild pathology, such as may be seen in analogue 
samples of socially anxious, depressed, or nonassertive college students, is associated with 
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a SOM labeled the Internal Dialogue of Conflict, with a set point of 0.50 and a range of 
values between 0.45 and 0.55. Moderate pathology, which may characterize many clinical 
samples of depressed or anxious persons, is associated with the SOM labeled Negative 
Dialogue, with a set point of 0.38 and a range of 0.32–0.44. Severe psychopathology, such 
as that manifested in profound depression or acute panic, is associated with the SOM la-
beled Negative Monologue, associated with ratio values less than 0.32. Finally, values in 
excess of 0.68 are associated with the SOM-labeled Positive Monologue, which is charac-
terized by insufficient attention to negative events and hypothetically related to patholog-
ical states as acute mania. 
Empirical evaluation of the SOM model is just beginning. However, Schwartz and Gar-
amoni (1986, 1989) have presented data derived from a review of cognitive assessment 
studies that provide support for a number of their hypotheses. On the basis of their 1989 
review, they conclude that (a) functional groups are, in fact, best characterized by a Posi-
tive Dialogue, (b) mildly dysfunctional groups are characterized by an Internal Dialogue 
of Conflict, and (c) moderately dysfunctional groups are characterized by Negative Dia-
logue. They also present data suggesting that the method of assessment (e.g., self-statement 
inventory vs. other methods) does not significantly influence these conclusions. Further-
more, Schwartz and Michelson (1987) demonstrated that the SOM ratio in a sample of ag-
oraphobics treated with cognitive-behavior therapy improved in predicted fashion and 
was related to both clinical improvement and end-state functioning. Kendall et al. (1989) 
report supportive data for points (b) and (c) above in samples of dysphoric college students 
and psychiatrically depressed patients. 
The current literature leaves many questions unanswered, two of which are addressed 
in the present studies with a clinical sample of individuals with social phobia. First, the 
SOM model and the “power-of-nonnegative-thinking” model have yet to be compared. A 
measure used to test the power of nonnegative-thinking model is the ratio of negative 
thoughts to total thoughts, and the first study reported below addresses the question of 
whether the SOM ratio differs from the percent of negative thoughts in its relationships to 
other measures of social anxiety and performance. The key to this question actually re-
volves around the role of neutral thoughts in the internal dialogue. Are they “cognitive 
noise” and therefore to be omitted from the thought ratio, as suggested by Schwartz and 
Garamoni’s ratio of P/(P + N)? Or might the presence of a quantity of neutral thoughts alter 
the impact of negative thoughts, as suggested by their place in the denominator of the 
Negative Thoughts ratio of N/(P + N + Ne = Total)? The two ratios differ only on the inclu-
sion of neutral thoughts, since without neutral thoughts, the negative thoughts ratio equals 
the inverse of the SOM ratio. 
Second, the question of mode of assessment requires further examination. Schwartz and 
Garamoni (1989) have concluded that SOM ratios are unaffected by mode of assessment. 
However, their argument requires further evaluation for two reasons. First, their analysis 
is based on the comparison of group means provided in already-conducted studies and 
therefore cannot address the question of whether one individual would be similarly clas-
sified by SOM ratios derived from different assessment techniques. Second, the published 
literature on which they based their conclusion was incomplete since it included no studies 
in which self-statement inventories were completed by a moderately dysfunctional group 
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of subjects, such as the ones included in the present report. Thus, the second study reported 
below assesses the concordance between self-statement inventory and thought-listing 
measures administered to the same group of subjects and examines whether the two as-
sessments of SOM are, in fact, equivalent. 
 
Study 1 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
Subjects in this study were 28 men and 23 women aged 19 to 50 (M = 30.29) who sought 
treatment for a variety of social-evaluative fears at the Phobia and Anxiety Disorders 
Clinic, University at Albany, State University at New York. Thirty-two subjects listed social 
interaction as their primary fear while an additional 19 subjects reported fears in perfor-
mance-related situations such as public speaking, working while being observed or eating, 
drinking, or writing in public. Fifty-five percent of the subjects had completed college, and 
69 percent had never been married. All subjects were screened with the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule (ADIS; DiNardo, O’Brien, Barlow, Waddell, & Blanchard, 1983) or its 
revision (DiNardo & Barlow, 1988) and received a primary diagnosis of social phobia ac-
cording to DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980) or DSM-III-R (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1987) criteria. The ADIS is a structured interview with demonstrated 
reliability for the diagnosis of anxiety disorders (kappa = 0.91 for social phobia) (Barlow, 
1987). Interviews were conducted by licensed clinical psychologists or advanced doctoral 
students. The ADIS interviewer also rated each subject on the Phobic Severity Rating Scale 
developed by Watson and Marks (1971). Only subjects reporting moderate to severe im-
pairment in daily functioning, as indicated by a rating of 4 or greater on the 0-to-8 scale, 
participated in the study (M = 5.56; SD = 1.11). Forty-six of the 51 subjects received cognitive-
behavioral or education-supportive group treatment in a study reported by Heimberg, 
Dodge, Hope, Kennedy, Zollo, and Becker (1990). The data presented in this paper were 
collected as part of subjects’ pretreatment assessment. 
 
Assessment 
 
Questionnaires. Subjects completed a battery of self-report measures including the Social 
Avoidance and Distress Scale (SADS; Watson & Friend, 1969), the Fear of Negative Evalu-
ation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969), and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961). They also completed the positive and negative 
subscales of the Social Interaction Self-Statement Test (SISST; Glass et al., 1982), a self-report 
measure of self-statement activity during social interactions. The original instructions for 
the SISST were modified to delete references to a role-played social situation. Subjects were 
simply asked to rate how frequently they may have experienced each self-statement be-
fore, during, or after interaction with the opposite sex on a scale from 1 (hardly ever had 
the thought) to 5 (very often experienced the thought). Data supportive of the validity of 
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this approach to the use of the SISST with social phobics have been reported by Dodge, 
Hope, Heimberg, and Becker (1988). 
Subjects were given the questionnaire packets when they came to the clinic for the be-
havioral test described below. They completed these measures at home prior to the start of 
treatment. 
 
Individualized Behavioral Test. All subjects participated in an individualized behavioral 
simulation of an anxiety-provoking situation. Each test situation was selected on the basis 
of questionnaire data and initial interviews to recreate a situation from the individual’s life 
that typically evoked high levels of anxiety. These included such situations as initiating a 
conversation with a person of the opposite sex, talking with two strangers at a party, or 
giving a speech. Graduate and undergraduate assistants served as role-play partners or 
audience members. During the 4-min simulation, measures of physiological and subjective 
arousal were collected. 
 
Heart rates. Subjects’ physiological arousal during the behavioral simulation was assessed 
with a portable heart rate monitor (Exersentry III, Model 51330, by Respironics, Inc.), as 
described in detail by Heimberg, Gansler, Dodge, and Becker (1987) and Heimberg et al. 
(1990). After a baseline for adaptation to physiological recording and a period for the meas-
urement of anticipatory arousal (see Heimberg et al., 1990), subjects’ arousal in the 4-min 
test situation was monitored. Heart rate in beats per minute was calculated for the first 30 s 
of the performance and the 30 s surrounding each SUDS rating given by the subject (see 
below). The mean of these samples served as the measure of physiological arousal for the 
present study. 
 
Subjective anxiety. Subjects reported their subjective anxiety at 1 min intervals (initial, 
end of minutes 1–4) during the behavioral simulation on a 0–100 Subjective Units of Dis-
comfort Scale.(SUDS). The mean of these ratings served as one measure of subjective anx-
iety for the present study. After the simulation, subjects also completed the State portion 
of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-state; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). 
 
Thought listing. Cognitive activity in response to the behavioral stimulation was assessed 
with the thought-listing procedure used previously with socially anxious college students 
(Cacioppo, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1979; Heimberg, Nyman, & O’Brien, 1987). Immediately fol-
lowing the simulation, subjects were given prepared forms and asked to record the thoughts 
they experienced, ignoring spelling, grammar, and punctuation. Graduate assistants, una-
ware of the hypotheses of the present study, categorized the thoughts as positive, negative, 
or neutral (as defined above). Interrater agreement for a subsample of 17 subjects was 95% 
(kappa = 0.93). 
 
Calculation of SOM and Percent Negative Thoughts Ratios. The formula for the SOM 
ratio was P/(P + N), while the formula for the Percent Negative Thoughts ratio was N/(P + 
N + Ne). However, recent research conducted by Amsel and Fichten (1990) suggests that 
calculation of ratios based on these raw frequencies may lead to spurious results because 
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of difficulties associated with zero frequencies of positive or negative thoughts. For in-
stance, the SOM ratio will always have a value of 0 when the frequency of positive thoughts 
is 0, regardless of the number of negative thoughts recorded, and a value of 1 when no 
negative thoughts are recorded, regardless of the frequency of positive thoughts. To over-
come this problem, Amsel and Fichten (1990) have suggested that it would be most appro-
priate to add a constant of 1.0 to the frequency of positive or negative thoughts when either 
(but not both) of these values is 0. This practice was followed in the present study. A similar 
modification was made to the Percent Negative Thoughts ratio.1 
 
Results 
 
SOM ratios could not be computed for two subjects who completed the behavioral test but 
listed only neutral thoughts, and they were omitted from further analysis. The remaining 
49 subjects achieved a mean SOM ratio of 0.28 (SD = 0.16), a score placing the average 
subject in the Negative Monologue range. Their mean percentage of listed negative 
thoughts was 63% (SD = 19%).2 The SOM and Negative Thoughts ratios were very highly 
correlated (r = –0.79, N = 49, p < .001, arcsine transformation applied). 
 
Table I. Comparison of Correlations between SOM Ratio, Percent Negative Thoughts Ratio, and 
Measures of Social Anxiety and Depressiona 
Measure M SD SOM ratio 
Negative 
Thoughts ratio 
SADSb 18.89 8.84 –.57e .38d 
FNE 24.44 6.29 –.35d .37d 
SISST-Positive 36.89 11.62 .29c –.17 
SISST-Negative 48.17 15.30 –.51e .48e 
Behavioral Test Measures     
   STAI-State 51.44 12.09 –.26c .28c 
   Heart Rate 102.44 19.51 .11 .02 
   SUDS 51.28 22.08 –.29c .32c 
BDI 14.85 8.71 –.29c .19 
Phobic Severity 5.52 1.07 –.13 –.07 
a. Note: ns vary between 38–49 because of missing data. SOM and Negative Thoughts ratios are both derived 
from the thought-listing task. SOM = States of Mind, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, FNE = 
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, SISST = Social Interaction Self-Statement Test, STAI = State-Trait Anxi-
ety Inventory, SUDS = Subjective Units of Discomfort, BDI = Beck Depression Inventory. 
b. Correlation between measure and SOM ratio is significantly different from correlation between measure 
and Negative Thoughts ratio (p < .05, 2-tailed test). 
c. p < .05 
d. p < .01 
e. p < .001 
 
Table I displays the means and standard deviations for the criterion measures in this 
sample of 49 social phobics and the correlations between these measures and the two-self-
statement ratios (arcsine transformation applied). Of nine measures included in Table I, 
the SOM ratio was significantly related to seven while the Negative Thoughts ratio was 
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significantly related to 5. Both ratios were significantly related to scores on the SADS and 
FNE and to self-rated anxiety during (SUDS) and after (STAI-State) the behavioral test. 
Both ratios were significantly related to the negative self-statement subscale of the SISST, 
but only the SOM ratio was significantly related to SISST positive self-statement scores. 
The SOM ratio was also significantly related to depression as measured by the BDI while 
the Negative Thoughts ratio was not. However, the two ratios were differentially related 
to only a single measure, the SADS. 
 
Study 2 
 
Method 
Subjects in Study 2 were the subset of 30 subjects (15 men, 15 women) from Study 1 who 
sought treatment specifically for their fears concerning social interactions and who pro-
vided the listings of positive or negative thoughts necessary for calculating the SOM ratio. 
The mean age of this subsample was 27.23 years (range = 19–44). Forty percent of this group 
had completed college, while 80% had never been married. Other subjects, who reported 
a variety of noninteractional fears, were excluded in order to increase the probability that 
subjects’ responses to the SISST and their thought listings after the behavioral test would 
concern the same behavioral domain. Since the behavioral test was individualized, only 
subjects with primary fears of social interaction could be included. 
In this study, assessment data collected as described above were utilized to test the im-
pact of deriving SOM ratios from the thought-listing task or from the SISST. 
 
Results 
 
Subjects achieved a mean score on the negative self-statement subscale of the SISST of 52.67 
(SD = 14.12) and a mean score on the positive self-statement subscale of 35.07 (SD = 11.81). 
These scores are similar to those reported by Glass and Furlong (1990) for clinical samples 
of socially anxious individuals. 
SOM ratio scores based on thought listing (M = 0.25, SD = 0.09) were significantly lower 
than ratio scores based on the SISST (M = 0.40, SD = 0.12), t(29) = 6.32, p < .001. In addition, 
the mean scores placed the average subject into different SOMs—Negative Dialogue for 
the SISST and Negative Monologue for thought listing. 
SOM ratios based on SISST and thought-listing data differed not only on mean score 
but also on distribution characteristics as suggested by a nonsignificant r of 0.19 (n = 30, 
arcsine transformation applied). Table II displays the number of subjects whose SOM ra-
tios would classify them into the various SOM categories when these have been calculated 
on the basis of either thought listing or SISST data. As can be seen clearly from this table, 
thought listing not only resulted in mean SOM scores that were more negative but also 
placed the greatest percentage of individuals into the most negative category (Negative 
Monologue, 70%). Eight of the remaining nine subjects were placed in the Negative Dia-
logue category. In contrast, the most common classification of subjects based on their SISST 
scores was in the Negative Dialogue category (13 subjects, 43%) compared to only eight 
subjects (27%) who are classified into Negative Monologue. Five subjects’ (17%) SISST 
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scores placed them in the Internal Dialogue of Conflict range, while four (13%) were clas-
sified into Positive Dialogue. No subjects in this sample were placed in the Positive Mon-
ologue SOM by either assessment device. 
 
Table II. Classification of Subjects into SOM Categories as Determined by Thought Listing and SISST 
SOM category Thought Listing SISST 
Negative Monologue 21 8 
Negative Dialogue 8 13 
Internal Dialogue of Conflict 1 5 
Positive Dialogue 0 4 
Positive Monologue 0 0 
Note: SOM = States of Mind 
 
Another way to examine classification differences resulting from the use of SISST and 
thought-listing scores is to look at the specific instances of agreement and disagreement in 
individual classification into SOMs. Thirteen subjects (43%) were classified identically by 
the two procedures, while the classifications of 17 subjects (57%) were in conflict. One sub-
ject (3%) received a classification based on the SISST that was one category more negative 
than the classification based on thought listing. The remaining 16 subjects (53%) received 
a classification based on their thought-listing scores that was one or more categories more 
negative than their classification based on SISST scores. Of these, the classifications of 
seven subjects (23%) disagreed by two or more steps (e.g., a disagreement between nega-
tive monologue and internal dialogue of conflict or positive dialogue). 
While the two procedures for deriving SOMs appear to have different classification con-
sequences, it is not clear from the above if one or the other has greater validity. In order to 
get a preliminary reading on this question, we calculated zero-order correlations (arcsine 
transformation applied) between several of the measures included in Study 1 and the 
SISST and thought listing SOMs, and these are presented in Table III. 
In general, SOM ratios derived from the SISST were more closely related to the criterion 
measures than SOMs derived from thought listing. Of seven measures included in Table 
III, the SISST SOM ratio was significantly related to four, while the thought-listing measure 
was related to only two. Tests of the difference between dependent correlations revealed 
that the SISST SOM was significantly more highly related to scores on the SADS (p < .05) 
and tended (p < .10) to be more highly related to scores on the FNE. In only one case (STAI-
state) was the relationship stronger for the thought-listing SOM, but this difference be-
tween correlations failed to achieve statistical significance.3 
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Table III. Comparison of Correlations of SOM Ratio Derived from Thought Listing and from 
SISST and Measures of Social Anxiety and Depressiona 
Measure M SD Thought Listing SISST 
SADSb 21.59 7.17 –.21 –.66d 
FNE 25.37 5.71 –.30c –.66d 
Behavioral Test Measures     
   STAI-State 54.52 13.02 –.3lc –.17 
   Heart Rate 99.68 17.47 –.12 –.07 
   SUDS 48.34 19.08 –.08 –.04 
BDI 16.68 8.51 .04 –.31c 
Phobic Severity 5.81 1.01 .04 –.36c 
a. Note: ns vary between 23–30 because of missing data. SOM = States of Mind, SISST = Social Interaction 
Self-Statement Test, SADS = Social Avoidance and Distress Scale, FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, 
STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, SUDS = Subjective Units of Discomfort, BDI = Beck Depression In-
ventory 
b. Correlation between measure and Thought Listing SOM ratio is significantly different from correlation 
between measure and SISST SOM ratio (p < .05, 2-tailed test). 
c. p < .05 
d. p < .001 
 
General Discussion 
 
The studies we conducted were intended to shed light on conceptual and methodological 
issues surrounding the States of Mind model proposed by Schwartz and Garamoni (1986, 
1989). In the first study, the SOM ratio was evaluated by comparing it to a ratio of negative 
thoughts to the total of positive + negative + neutral thoughts. This Negative Thoughts 
ratio was derived from the approach to the internal dialogue that suggests that negatively 
biased cognition may have a relatively greater effect on coping and adjustment than posi-
tive cognition (Kendall & Hollon, 1981). The SOM model’s concept of positive asymmetry 
has begun to generate empirical support, yet measures derived from the two approaches 
have not been previously compared. 
The results of Study 1 are supportive of both models. The SOM and Negative Thoughts 
ratios were highly correlated, and both were significantly related to several criterion 
measures. While the number of significant correlations was somewhat larger for the SOM 
ratio (7 vs. 5), the differences appear smaller than the similarities. 
Since the SOM and Negative Thought ratios differ only in the inclusion of neutral 
thoughts, these findings may be used to evaluate Schwartz and Garamoni’s (1986, 1989) 
contention that neutral thoughts contribute little to the internal dialogue. In fact, in Study 
1, the inclusion of neutral thoughts appeared to add little if anything. Since the SOM ratio 
was significantly related to a few more criterion measures than the Negative Thoughts 
ratio, the inclusion of neutral thoughts may actually have detracted from the validity of 
the ratio. 
Two additional points deserve mention about the results of Study 1. First, while the 
relationship of SOMs derived from thought listing and the SISST is described below, Study 
1 reports the relationship of the thought-listing SOM ratio and Negative Thoughts ratio to 
H E I M B E R G  E T  A L . ,  C O G N I T I V E  T H E R A P Y  A N D  R E S E A R C H  1 4  (1 9 9 0 )  
10 
the positive and negative self-statement subscales of the SISST. Both ratios were signifi-
cantly related to the negative self-statement subscale. Only the SOM ratio was significantly 
related to the positive self-statement subscale. In both cases, however, the correlation with 
negative self-statements was significantly larger than the correlation with positive self-
statements (p < .05 for both, 2-tailed tests). Both ratios appear to be most heavily influenced 
by negative thoughts, at least in this sample of social phobics. 
Second, the SOM ratio derived from thought listing in Study 1 averaged 0.28. This value 
places the sample average in the Negative Monologue range, a range characterized by 
Schwartz and Garamoni (1989) as related to severe psychopathology such as profound de-
pression or acute panic. However, their descriptions of the different SOMs and the degree 
of psychopathology associated with each suggest that these social phobics are better de-
scribed as “moderately” pathological. 
Study 2 compared SOM ratios and classifications derived from the two cognitive assess-
ment measures. This study was undertaken to test Schwartz and Garamoni’s (1989) asser-
tion that method of assessment does not influence the SOM ratio. Their conclusion was 
based on a review of an incomplete literature—no moderately pathological samples who 
responded to self-report inventories and no individual subject data were included. Con-
trary to their assertion, significant differences between thought-listing and SISST SOMs 
did arise. As in Study 1, thought listing led to an average score in the Negative Monologue 
range, but the SISST led to an average score in the Negative Dialogue range. The latter 
classification appears to provide a better fit with Schwartz and Garamoni’s description of 
moderate pathology. 
In addition to the overall description of the sample, the two cognitive assessment meth-
ods differed in the likelihood of classification of individual subjects in the various SOM 
categories. Disagreements between method appeared for nearly two-thirds of the subjects 
in Study 2. In 16 of these 17 cases, thought listing led to a more negative judgment than 
did the SISST. 
The SISST SOM also appeared to be more closely related to the criterion measures than 
the thought-listing SOM. The SISST SOM was more closely related to scores on the SADS 
and tended to be more closely related to scores on the FNE. It was also significantly corre-
lated with the clinician’s rating of phobic severity, an important finding since it suggests 
that the remaining pattern of correlations was not a simple artifact of method variance. 
Why do SOMs from the two sources differ? While a conclusive answer to that question 
is not available, there is a substantial literature suggesting that the outputs of thought list-
ing and questionnaire methods are not that closely related (see Amkoff & Glass, 1989, for 
a review of this question in the context of social anxiety and social phobia). However, an 
additional notion is worth considering in the present context. In our research, the thought 
listing procedure is administered after the behavioral test with instructions to report on 
thoughts related to subjects’ performance and the minutes leading up to it (a “state” meas-
ure), while the SISST is administered as a more general “trait” measure as reported by 
Dodge et al. (1988). Thus the thought listing is more closely tied to acute exposure to the 
phobic situation. As a result, subjects may be more acutely anxious and more attuned to 
their current negative thinking, thus classifying themselves more often into Negative Mon-
ologue. The more general instructions of our version of the SISST may prompt a less acute, 
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and therefore less extreme, self-evaluation. Therefore, in a sense, both assessments may be 
accurate. This logic may also explain the greater likelihood of (or greater magnitude of) 
relationship between the SISST SOM and the SADS, FNE, and BDI (measures of relatively 
stable characteristics), and the finding that only the thought listing SOM was significantly 
related to a measure of anxiety administered directly after the behavioral test. It might also 
account for the finding of a significant relationship between the clinician rating of phobic 
severity and the SISST SOM (but not the thought listing SOM) since this measure assesses 
general level of impairment in functioning rather than acute distress in a phobic situation. 
Schwartz and Garamoni (1986, 1989; Schwartz, personal communication 12/27/89) have 
previously noted that SOM ratios may be generally stable but may fluctuate to some de-
gree as a function of situational factors such as success or failure. 
Given this logic, a comparison to a recent study by Glass and Furlong (1990) is instruc-
tive. In the context of a larger study, highly socially anxious community volunteers com-
pleted a behavioral test, the SISST, and a thought-listing task. The SISST was administered 
with Glass et al.’s (1982) original instructions and followed the behavioral test. Despite the 
differences between studies, however, the SISST SOMs were quite similar (Glass & Fur-
long: .44; present study: .40), both resulting in classification in Negative Dialogue. In their 
study, thought listing was administered in advance of the behavioral test and led to a dif-
ferent finding than the present study (Glass & Furlong: .39; present study: .25). Thus, at 
least as far as thought listing is concerned, it may be quite reactive to its relative placement 
in the overall cognitive-behavioral assessment. Further studies of the reactivity of thought 
listing and of the different pictures that may be drawn by “trait” vs. “state” cognitive as-
sessment measures appear warranted. 
Overall the results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest support for the SOM model but an in-
creased degree of caution in generalizing across assessment devices and assessment situa-
tions than has been previously asserted. It should be noted that our own results should not 
be generalized beyond moderately dysfunctional subjects. Future studies should examine 
the performance of. the SOM ratio against other potential measures of the internal dialogue 
and in a variety of assessment situations. This may be of special interest in assessing the 
SOM ratio as a measure of treatment response as has been done by Schwartz and Michel-
son (1987). 
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Notes 
 
1. While Amsel and Fichten (1990) have demonstrated the utility of adding the correction factor in 
a sample of undergraduates, its value in a clinical sample has yet to be demonstrated. This is 
potentially important because of the extreme infrequency with which social phobics report posi-
tive thoughts at pretreatment assessment. In this study, 31 subjects listed zero positive thoughts. 
Of these 31, two subjects listed no negative thoughts and were omitted. Three additional subjects 
listed no negative thoughts, so that the correction factor suggested by Amsel and Fichten (1990) 
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was applied to the scores of 32 of 49 subjects. As a precautionary measure, all analyses reported 
in this paper were also conducted without the correction factor, and analyses were conducted 
substituting raw frequencies of positive and negative thoughts for ratio scores. As reported by 
Amsel and Fichten (1990), the results for corrected ratios were most similar to the results for raw 
frequencies. Therefore, only results for corrected ratios are reported in this paper. A summary of 
results and revised tables based on uncorrected thought listing ratios are available from the first 
author. 
2. Subjects’ mean SOM ratio calculated without the Amsel-Fichten correction factor was 0.17 (SD = 0.27). 
Their uncorrected percentage of negative thoughts was 68% (SD = 31 %). Mean frequencies of 
specific thought categories were: positive thoughts 0.69 (SD = 1.18), negative thoughts 337 (SD = 1.74), 
neutral thoughts 0.86 (SD = 1.08), and total thoughts 4.92 (SD = 1.26). 
3. An anonymous reviewer noted the apparent difference between correlations for the thought list-
ing SOM ratio reported in Tables I and III. Specifically, correlations between the thought-listing 
SOM ratio and the SADS, the BDI, and SUDS ratings from the behavioral test were significant in 
Table I but not in Table III. This discrepancy is the result of dropping performance-anxious sub-
jects from the Study 2 sample, a move necessitated by the evaluation of the SISST, an instrument 
specifically focused on social interaction. Analyses of Study I data separately for performance-
anxious and socially anxious subjects (i.e., discrete vs. generalized social phobics) suggests that 
these measures may be more closely related among performance-anxious subjects. We have pre-
viously reported greater “cognitive involvement” among performance-anxious subjects (Heim-
berg, Hope, Dodge, & Becker, 1990). However, since these issues are not the focus of the present 
research, they will be reported in a future publication. 
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